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Abstract 
The paper studies the factors associated with the emergence of banking crises during the process of financial 
liberalization in a large sample of cross-countries in 1989-1997 using a spatial Durbin model in a panel data 
econometrics. The empirical results suggest that financial liberalization has the tendency to stimulate the banking 
instability in economies. Financial liberalization played a significant role in the transmission of the banking crisis to 
emerging market economies. In addition, the results indicate that tighter entry restrictions and more severe regulatory 
restrictions on bank activities boost bank fragility; these are consistent with the results obtained by Barth et al. (2004). 
Then we find evidence that the measures of bank regulation variables also contributed, either positively or negatively, 
towards the observed crisis outcomes, with poor institutional environment playing a particularly significant role. 
Besides we find that the impact of the determinants differ slightly between whole sample and emerging economies. 
Keywords: Banking crisis, spatial Durbin model, financial liberalization, regulation, institutions 
 
1. Introduction 
The financial liberalization around the globe is fueling an active public debate on the impact of financial 
liberalization on financial stability. Indeed, economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the relationship 
between the financial liberalization and the competitiveness of the banking industry and banking system fragility. 
Motivated by public policy debates and ambiguous theoretical predictions, this paper investigates empirically the 
impact of financial liberalization, bank regulations and whether it depends on institutional characteristics of the 
banking system stability. 
Some theoretical arguments and country comparisons suggest that banking crises are more likely to occur in 
liberalized financial systems. Alfaro & Hammel (2007), Kim & Kenny (2006), Menzie & Hiro (2005), Bekaert et al 
(2005), and others, suggest that developing countries should liberalize the financial system to ensure its proper 
operation and initiate economic growth. According to these authors, financial liberalization reinforces the idea that a 
free development of the financial sphere would allow the development of the real sphere by an optimal allocation of 
capital and generate rapid economic growth for developing countries. 
However, the desired result was not achieved. On the contrary, that financial liberalization has led to very serious 
banking crises. Indeed, financial liberalization is a factor in weakening internal and external economies. Recently, 
Giannetti (2007) advocates that "Financial liberalizations in emerging markets are Often Followed by reckless 
lending and severe banking crises". Similarly, Aka (2006) states that "In the past five years, Financial Crises Have 
Several rattled Most Of The Emerging market economies in Asia, Europe, and south America. These crises were 
deeply related to the process of Financial Liberalization and Financial globalization". A first reading of this statement 
shows that the contribution of financial liberalization on financial development and economic growth has been 
strongly challenged. This thesis is corroborated by Daniel & Jones (2006) who found that most banking crises that 
hit emerging economies had been caused by movements of financial liberalization. In this context, Ranciere et al 
(2006) have shown that financial liberalization can lead to a higher level of risk, increase the volatility of 
macroeconomic indicators and increase the probability of occurrence of banking crises. Other studies, in particular 
those conducted by Barell et al (2006) and Tornell et al (2004) have validated this observation. Finally, Suwanaporn 
& Menkhoff (2007), Currie (2006), show that financial liberalization pursued in a slightly-developed institutional 
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environment accentuates the proliferation of banking crises. 
The empirical research into the causes and consequences of banking crises in cross-countries has only started to draw 
professional concentration in the last several years. We look at one of the most central policy questions in front of 
this empirical study, the responsibility of financial liberalization, in its complete effort to present policy makers with 
recommendation on preventing crises, determining their beginning earlier, and mitigating their adverse effects. In 
their pioneering study, of the relation between financial liberalization and banking crisis, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) examine the empirical relationship between banking crises and financial liberalization using data 
from 1980 to 1995 for 53 different countries. They find that banking crises are indeed more likely to occur in 
countries that have liberalized their financial systems, even after controlling for other country characteristics. They 
also find that the impact of financial liberalization on a fragile banking sector is mitigated by a strong institutional 
environment. Weller (2001) finds that a banking crisis becomes more likely after domestic financial liberalization.
1
 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2002) suggest after the work of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache by distinguishing between 
the effects of internal and external financial liberalization that is captured by a 0/1 dummy. Furthermore, they find 
that capital account liberalization does not contribute to a banking crisis but internal financial liberalization does. 
Noy (2004) considers interactions between domestic financial liberalization and supervision and concludes that, if 
liberalization is accompanied by insufficient prudential supervision of the banking sector, it will result in excessive 
risk taking by financial intermediaries and a subsequent crisis. 
Ranciere et al (2006) examine the relationship between financial liberalization and crises and they find that in a large 
sample of countries, financial liberalization typically leads to financial fragility and occasional financial crises. 
However, financial liberalization has led to faster long-run growth. Barth et al (2004) study the restrictions on bank 
activity, entry restrictions, and privatization. They also find that restrictions on banking activity and foreign bank 
entry stimulate the likelihood of banking crises, whereas government ownership does not have a significant effect on 
this likelihood. 
Tanveer and Haan (2008) focus on the impact of financial liberalization on systemic and non-systemic banking crises 
for a sub-sample of developing and developed countries covering the period 1981 to 2002. In contrast to 
conventional wisdom, they adopt the multivariate (two stage) probit modeling and their results consistently suggest 
that financial liberalization reduces the likelihood of systemic crises. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the 
likelihood of non-systemic crisis increases after financial liberalization. 
Finally, Apanard et al. (2010) use a recently updated dataset for financial reforms in 48 countries between 1973 and 
2005. They argue that banking crises are most likely to occur after some degree, but not full, liberalization. Their 
empirical results indicate that the relationship between liberalization and banking crises is mainly caused by the 
strength of capital regulation and supervision. One policy implication of the analysis is that positive growth effects of 
financial liberalization can be obtained with no a simultaneous increase in the likelihood of banking crises if 
appropriate institutions are developed. 
Overall, this brief survey of the theoretical and empirical literature suggests that there is no consensus what the 
relation between financial liberalization and financial stability is. In spite of the great number of contributions to this 
area of study, the evaluation of the impact of the increase in stability continues to be of great importance. This paper 
contributes to this literature by basing on spatial econometrics approach. Indeed, in period of financial liberalization 
the release of banking fragility looks through: First the transmission channels of fundamental contagion or 
interdependence between countries such as macroeconomic similarities, channels of trade2 and financial transfers. 
On the other hand, the transmission channels of pure contagion, such as endogenous liquidity shocks and information 
shocks. These transmission channels gave the cause of the failure of econometrics classic for this type of modeling. 
The classical econometrics was customary in modeling, it has experienced an almost systematic use and several 
studies have shown that these models may hide important properties such as the spatial autocorrelation that may 
occur because the data are affected by processes that connect different places through activities in space and the 
spatial heterogeneity that  means that economic behaviors are not stable in the space, this phenomenon is not going 
                                                      
1Gruben et al. (2003) deduce that banks are much more possible to fail in a liberalized regime than under financial repression. 
2For a detailed discussion of trade linkages, see Gerlach and Smets (1995), Eichengreen et al. (1996), and Corsetti et al. (2000). 
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to be part of  this work but it can be integrated as a future extension. 
Our results confirm some previous findings in the literature: spatial panel estimates lend support in favor of the 
determinants of a banking crisis which explicitly take into account ‘spatial’ interactions among observed countries 
with trade channels as primordial transmission mechanisms. We find evidence that the data do not support the view 
that more competition increases fragility. The results indicate that tighter entry restrictions and more severe 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities boost bank fragility; these are consistent with the results obtained by Barth 
et al. (2004). Besides, in terms of financial liberalization, there is some evidence that the likelihood of banking crisis 
increases after financial liberalization. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and presents summary statistics. Section 3 
contains the main results and section 4summarizes the results with concluding remarks. 
 
2. Methodology and data 
Our sampling covers the period 1989-1997. Table 1 describes the variables and their sources and table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics for the whole sample. Concerning the construction of our panel, we are limited to 49emerging, 
developed and developing countries (Table 3) those affected by banking crisis.  
Table 1-3 (see Appendix) 
We adopt nonperforming Loans as a proxy for banking crisis as endogenous variable. Indeed, for the banking crisis 
the authors use different dates for both the trigger and the resolution oft he same crisis. An alternative approach, 
suggested by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Demirgu¸c-Kunt and Detragianche (1997), is to adopt the bank 
nonperforming loan (NPL) to proxy for banking crisis. So we follow this suggestion to use NPL as the proxy of the 
banking crisis. 
We control for many factors, while the sign of the estimated coefficient for each explanatory variable indicates 
whether an increase of that explanatory variable increases or decreases the probability of a crisis. Specifically, we 
begin with the use of the spatial panel model as regression, such as, spatial error model, patial lag model and spatial 
Durbin model. 
We use three measures of bank regulation. 
Activity restrictions aggregates measures indicate whether bank activities in the securities, insurance, and real estate 
markets and ownership and control of nonfinancial firms are (1) unrestricted, (2) permitted, (3) restricted, or (4) 
prohibited. The aggregate indicator has therefore a possible maximum variation between four and 16, with higher 
numbers indicating more restrictions on bank activities and nonfinancial ownership and control. If these restrictions 
sustain banks from entering excessively risky lines of business, then they may encourage banking system stability. If 
nevertheless, restrictions prevent firms from diversifying outside their traditional lines of business, they may increase 
the fragility of the system. 
Required reserves represent the ratio of bank assets that regulators require banks to hold as reserves. Higher ratios of 
required reserves affect the banking systems to be more stable since they would have a greater buffer to absorb 
liquidity shocks. On the other hand, larger required reserves are in addition a tax on the banking system, which may 
lower profits and raise fragility. 
Capital regulatory index is given by the sum of initial capital stringency and overall capital requirements. To the 
extent that book capital is an accurate measure of bank solvency we expect better capitalized banks to be less fragile. 
We also use three additional variables to capture the extent of banking freedom and general economic freedom and 
the institutional environment.  
Banking freedom is an index of the openness of the banking system. It is a composite indicator of whether foreign 
banks are able to operate freely, the degree of regulation of financial market activities, whether the government 
influences allocation of credit, and whether banks are free to provide customers with insurance products and invest in 
securities. Higher values indicate fewer restrictions on banking freedoms.  
Economic freedom is an indicator of how a country’s policies rank in terms of providing economic freedoms. It is a 
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composite of ten indicators ranking policies in the areas of trade, government finances, government interventions, 
monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, 
regulation, and black market activity. The higher measures of aggregate indicate polices more conducive to 
competition and economic freedom by diversifying their risks and engage in different activities. However, greater 
freedoms also allow banks to undertake greater risks, particularly if existing regulations distort risk-taking incentives. 
Consequently, overall greater freedom may also lead to greater bank fragility.  
KKZ_composite is an indicator of the overall level of institutional development constructed by Kaufman et al. 
(1999). The underlying indicators are voice and accountability, government effectiveness, political stability, 
regulatory quality, and control of corruption. We expect better institutions to lead to reduced bank fragility, 
controlling for all other factors.  
 
3. Empirical finding 
This section employs the spatial econometrics tools to analyze the period 1989 to 1997, period well-known us 
banking crisis of South East Asia and Latin America. In its most general form, the selected regression model is given 
by: 
( )
1 1
,
0,1
N N
it i ij jt it ij ijt it
j j
it
y w y x w x
N
α δ β γ ε
ε
= =
′= + + + +∑ ∑

                   (1) 
Where y is a nonperforming loans variable taking value for any of the entire sample of 49 countries and three 
country groups, x is the controlled variables defined earlier. ij
w
 is exogenously specified n x n lag weights matrices. 
As suggested earlier, to test for sources of autocorrelation or interdependence, we can specify weights matrices based 
on different concepts of ‘neighborhood’. In this article, we utilize an exogenously specifying matrices based on 
international trade data. The matrix is created us: Total international trade-based, ( )TW . This matrix adds up exports 
and imports to form the weights.
3
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results when adopting a non-spatial panel data model for the total international 
trade-based’s weights matrices
( )TW . We control for different bank regulations and the institutional environment.4 We 
include indicators of bank regulations for three reasons. First, controlling for differences in national policies provides 
a simple robustness test of the relationship between financial liberalization and crises. Second, controlling for 
regulations provides additional information on the liberalization –stability relationship. Finally, examining the 
relationship between bank regulations and banking system stability is independently valuable. Countries implement 
regulations to promote banking system stability. This research provides some information about which policies 
work.
5
 
The estimation results are making for the whole sample and the subsamples of emerging markets. Also, table 4 
reports the estimation results test results to determine whether the spatial lag model or the spatial error model is more 
appropriate. When using the classic LM tests and robust LM test, both the hypothesis of no spatially lagged 
dependent variable and the hypothesis of no spatially auto correlated error term must be rejected at 5% as well as 1% 
significance, irrespective of the inclusion of spatial and/or time-period fixed effects. This provided that time-period 
                                                      
3
We can refer to Glick and Rose (1998). The matrix is clearly non-symmetrical ( )ij jiW W≠ . 
4
 We also controlled for public and foreign ownership.  
5
 These specifications exclude GDP per capita since it is also a proxy for the overall institutional environment, 
including bank regulations.  
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or spatial and time-period fixed effects are included.
6
Apparently, the decision to control for spatial and/or 
time-period fixed effects represents an important issue. 
Table 4 (see Appendix) 
We estimate the following panel model specification: 
[ ] 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,?
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , ,
ACTRES RRES CREGI
               BKFR ECOF KKZ LIB 牋 牋牋牋牋?牋牋牋牋牋
j t j t j tcountry j Time t
j t j t j t j t j t
NonPerflon β β β β
β β β β ε
= =
= + + + +
+ + + +
         (2) 
To investigate the (null) hypothesis that the spatial fixed effects are jointly insignificant, one may perform a 
likelihood ratio (LR) test. The results (33.592, with 49 degrees of freedom [df], p < 0.01) indicate that this hypothesis 
must be rejected. Similarly, the hypothesis that the time-period fixed effects are jointly insignificant must be rejected 
(36.931, 9df, p < 0.01). These test results justify the extension of the model with spatial and time-period fixed effects, 
which is also known as the two-way fixed effects model (Baltagi, 2005). The results are the same for whole sample 
and emerging economies' sub-sample. 
With respect to the general-to-specific approach adopted by Florax et al., (2003) and Mur and Angula (2009) we now 
consider the spatial Durbin specification of the determinant of banking fragility. Its results are reported in columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 5. The first column gives the results when this model is estimated using the direct approach and the 
second column when the coefficients are bias corrected. The results in columns (1) and (2) show that the difference 
between the coefficients estimates of the direct approach and of the bias corrected approach are small for the 
independent variables (X) and σ2. By contrast, the coefficients of the spatially lagged dependent variable (WY) and 
of the independent variables (WX) appear to be quite sensitive to the bias correction procedure. 
Table 5 (see Appendix) 
We estimate the following panel spatial model specification: 
[ ] 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,?
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , ,
A C T R E S R R E S C R E G I
                    B K F R E C O F K K Z L IB 牋 牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?
ij j t j t j tco un try j T im e t
j t j t j t j t j t
N onP er flo n W N onP erflo n
W X
µ β β β β
β β β β λ β ε
= =
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
   (3)   
To test the hypothesis whether the spatial Durbin model can be simplified to the spatial error model, H0: θ+δβ=0, 
one may perform a Wald or LR test. The results reported in the second column using the LR test (23.237, 9 df, 
p=0.001) indicate that this hypothesis must be rejected. Similarly, the hypothesis that the spatial Durbin model can be 
simplified to the spatial lag model, H0: θ=0, must be rejected (LR test: 22.641, 9 df, p=0.002). This implies that both 
the spatial error model and the spatial lag model must be rejected in favor of the spatial Durbin model. The same 
results’ tests are for whole sample and emerging economies' sub-sample. 
In Table 5, the third column reports the parameter estimates if we treat µi as a random variable rather than a set of 
fixed effects. Hausman's specification test can be used to test the random effects model against the fixed effects 
model (see Lee and Yu, 2010b for mathematical details).
7 
The results (-27.659, 14 df, p<0.015) indicate that the 
random effects model must be rejected. Another way to test the random effects model against the fixed effects model 
is to estimate the parameter "phi" ( φ
2
 in Baltagi, 2005), which measures the weight attached to the cross-sectional 
component of the data and which can take values on the interval [0,1]. If this parameter equals 0, the random effects 
model converges to its fixed effects counterpart; if it goes to 1, it converges to a model without any controls for 
spatial specific effects. We find phi=0.996, with t-value of 0.00, which just as Hausman's specification test indicates 
that the fixed and random effects models are significantly different from each other. 
                                                      
6
Note that the test results satisfy the condition that LM spatial lag + robust LM spatial error = LM spatial error + 
robust LM spatial lag (Anselin et al., 1996). 
7
Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2010) derive the Hausman test when the fixed and random effects models are estimated by 
2SLS instead of ML. 
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The results of spatial and time period fixed effects, spatial and time period fixed bias-corrected and random spatial 
effects, fixed time period effects are presented in table 5 for the whole sample and emerging economies’ sub-sample.  
The coefficient for financial liberalization is negative and consistent with the results obtained by Ranciere et al (2006) 
and strongly significant in the regression for all countries as well as emerging market countries. For emerging 
countries, the probability of a crisis is much higher due to an increased level of financial liberalization. 
We envision the results of the model estimates of Spatial Durbin. This model, explicitly tests the interaction effect 
between countries mentioned by several authors such Eichengreen et al. (1996). The effect of the interaction is 
supported through the channels of trade incorporating the weight matrix of exchange. Respect to Beck et al. (2004) 
we have several statistically significant variables. This result is obvious in light of the standard panel model 
estimation inefficient and not aware of the existence of spatial autocorrelation between countries. Moreover, it 
implies that the bank failure is explained by the contagion effect but also by the role played by institutional 
development, as indicated in the first column. 
The major coefficients of explanatory variables of the model space are statistically significant and values are 
provided. For the model "two-way fixed effects" (last column Table 3), we notice that the variable financial 
liberalization is significant and has a negative effect on the dependent variable explaining banking fragility. Financial 
liberalization reduces the probability of banking crises across countries. This result corresponds to what has been 
developed in the literature with the work of Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2001).  
Table 5 results indicate that the negative relationship between financial system liberalization and the probability of 
suffering a systemic banking crisis holds even when including measures of the regulatory environment, the general 
openness of the banking industry, the degree of economic freedom in the economy, and a general index of 
institutional development. When controlling for capital regulations, reserve requirements, banking freedom, 
economic freedom and a summary measure of institutional development, liberalization enters positive and 
significantly at the 5% level. 
Table 5 results also indicate that tighter entry restrictions and more severe regulatory restrictions on bank activities 
boost bank fragility. These are consistent with the results obtained by Barth et al. (2004), who examine the impact of 
entry restrictions on crises in a purely cross-country investigation. A higher fraction of entry applications denied—a 
proxy for tighter entry regulations—leads to higher levels of fragility in the banking system. This is consistent with 
the argument that restricted entry reduces the efficiency of the banking system, also making it more vulnerable to 
external shocks. Similarly, we find that restrictions on bank activities increase crisis probabilities. This result 
indicates that overall these restrictions prevent banks from diversifying outside their traditional business, reducing 
their ability to reduce the riskiness of their portfolios. The required reserves and capital regulatory index enter with 
significant coefficients. 
 The variables that capture the general openness and competitiveness of the banking system enter with negative and 
very significant coefficients, but the general openness of economic enter with positive and significant coefficients. 
Thus countries with less freedom in banking and generally more competitive economic policies are more likely to 
experience banking crises. This is the case despite the fact that these policies also tend to reduce entry barriers. The 
evidence is consistent with theories that emphasize the stabilizing effects of competition, but inconsistent with the 
many models that stress the destabilizing effects from competition. A better institutional environment is also 
associated with a lower probability of systemic crisis, as expected. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the present paper we confirmed that spatial panel models constitute a natural framework to analyze the 
determinants of banking crises. Furthermore, if there is spatial dependence, which is expected in the present setting, 
after giving the theoretical fundaments presented in the introduction, the spatial panel model is more appropriate. 
Therefore, the estimation of spatial panel models allowed us to overcome several of the shortcomings present in the 
previous banking crises empirical literature. 
Our empirical findings seem to lend support to the determinants of banking crises. We use spatial panel data models, 
among which the spatial lag model, the spatial error model, and the spatial Durbin model extended to include spatial 
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and/or time-period fixed effects or extended to include spatial random effects. Contrasting with previous findings, 
that financial liberalization contributes to the likelihood of a banking crisis. Then we find evidence that the measures 
of bank regulation variables also contributed, either positively or negatively, towards the observed crisis outcomes, 
with poor institutional environment playing a particularly significant role. 
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Appendix:  Tables 1-5 
Table 1: Descriptions and sources of the variables 
Variable  Description and source  
Nonperforming loans (BNONPERLOAN)                           
*Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans are the value of nonperforming loans divided by the 
total value of the loan portfolio (including nonperforming loans before the deduction of specific 
loan-loss provisions) FMI.
(A)    Variables of bank regulation 
Activity restrictions (ACTRES)     
*Sum of four measures that indicate whether bank activities in the securities, insurance and real 
estate markets and ownership and control of nonfinancial firms are (1) unrestricted, (2) permitted, 
(3) restricted, or (4) prohibited 
Required reserves (RRES) *Ratio of reserves required to be held by banks. 
Capital regulatory index (CREGI)           
*Summary measure of capital stringency: sum of overall and initial capital stringency.  Higher 
values indicate greater stringency. 
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(A)     Additional variables, baking freedom, economic freedom and institutional environment.  
Banking Freedom (BKFR) 
*Indicator of relative openness of banking and financial system: specifically, whether the foreign 
banks and financial services firms are able to operate freely, how difficult it is to open domestic 
banks and other financial services firms, how heavily regulated the financial system is, the presence 
of state-owned banks, whether the government influences allocation of credit, and whether banks 
are free to provide customers with insurance and invest in securities (and vice-versa).  The index 
ranges in value from 1 (very low – banks are primitive) to 5 (very high – few restrictions).  
Averaged over 1995-97 period. 
Economic Freedom (ECOF)  
*Composite of 10 institutional factors determining economic freedom: trade policy, fiscal burden of 
government, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign 
investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black market 
activity. Individual factors are weighted equally to determine overall score of economic freedom.  
A high score signifies an institutional or consistent set of policies that are most conducive to 
economic freedom, while a score close to 1 signifies a set of policies that are least conducive.  
Averaged over 1995-97 period.  
KKZ_composite  (KKZ) 
*Composite of six governance indicators (1998 data): voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption.  Individual factors are 
weighted equally to determine overall score of economic freedom.  Higher values correspond to 
better governance outcomes. 
Financial Liberalisation        (Official 
Liberalization)(LIBFULL)  
Official Liberalization dates, presented in Table 2, are based on Bekaert and Harvey (2002) A 
Chronology of Important For the liberalizing countries, the associated Official Liberalization 
indicator takes a value of one when the equity market is officially liberalized and thereafter, and 
zero otherwise. For the remaining countries, fully segmented countries are assumed to have an 
indicator value of zero, and fully liberalized countries are assumed to have an indicator value of one 
Financial, Economic and Political Events in Emerging Markets,.  
 
 
Table 2: Countries included 
1 Australia 11 Panama 21 Japan 31 Belgium 41 Kenya 
2 Autria 12 Peru 22 Jordan 32 Denmark 42 Norway 
3 Canada 13 Portugal 23 Korea, Rep. 33 Dominican Republic 43 Nigeria 
4 Chile 14 United Kingdom 24 Malaysia 34 Egypt, Arab Rep. 44 Senegal 
5 Colombia 15 United States 25 Mexico 35 France 45 South Africa 
6 Ecuador 16 Venezuela 26 Netherlands 36 Germany 46 Sweden 
7 El Salvador 17 India 27 Philippines 37 Gabon 47 Switzerland 
8 Finland 18 Indonesia 28 Singapore 38 Ghana 48 Turkey 
9 Greece 19 Ireland 29 Thailand 39 Guatemala 49 Tunisia 
10 Lesotho 20 Israel 30 Afrique du Sud 40 Italy     
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
  BFREE2 CAPITALR CROSSID ECON2 KK_COMPO LIB RR RESTRICT 
 Mean 3.508129 5.560976 21 3.401423 0.579512 0.924119 10.8872 9.341463 
 Median 3.33333 6 21 3.46667 0.63 1 8 9 
 Maximum 5 8 41 4.5 1.72 1 43 14 
 Minimum 2 2 1 2.183333 -1 0 0 5 
 Std. Dev. 0.838891 1.640915 11.84822 0.555601 0.784358 0.265167 10.89098 2.517858 
 Skewness 0.085351 -0.307756 -3.16E-17 -0.28319 -0.201451 -3.20323 0.892335 -0.011007 
 Kurtosis 2.467978 2.434158 1.798571 2.221169 1.786503 11.26068 3.125201 2.084266 
                  
 Jarque-Bera 4.799873 10.74763 22.19275 14.25819 25.13665 1680.205 49.21115 12.90045 
 Probability 0.090724 0.004636 0.000015 0.000801 0.000003 0 0 0.00158 
                  
 Sum 1294.5 2052 7749 1255.125 213.84 341 4017.375 3447 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 258.9758 990.878 51660 113.5987 226.4003 25.87534 43649.77 2332.976 
                  
 Observations 441 441 441 441 441 441 441 441 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Estimation results I-Bank crisis, regulation, institutions and  liberalization: WT 
Determinants                             1 2 3 4 
  Pooled OLS                                 Spatial fixed effects                        Time-period fixed effects Spatial and time-period fixed effects 
  WS  EMG WS  EMG WS  EMG WS  EMG 
Intercept  14.93 14.047             
  [2.797] [2.754]             
Activity restrictions                 -0.27 -0.300 -0.132 -0.868 -0.883 -0.817 -0.729 -0.271 
  [-1.228]                [-1.481]                [-0.613] [-0.625] [-3.362]                         [-3.461]                         [-2.791] [-2.871] 
Required reserves                     0.216 0.221 0.211 1.111 0.244 1.244 0.232 0.267 
  [4.822] [4.721] [4.761] [4.541] [5.007] [5.107] [4.756] [4.326] 
Capital regulatory index           -0.242 -0.114 -0.182 0.814 -0.566 -0.534 -0.466 0.434 
  [-0.897] [-1.041] [-0.660] [-1.360] [-1.956] [-1.856] [-1.561] [-1.651] 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                     www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol 4, No.7, 2012 
 
 
191 
 
Financial Liberalisation           -5.238 -5.987 -5.683 -4.453 -4.388 -3.228 -4.841 -3.921 
  [-2.964] [-2.922] [-3.229]                 [-3.242]                 [-2.534] [-2.524] [-2.797] [-2.456] 
Banking Freedom -3.22 -3.34 -2.611 -1.612 -4.162 -3.542 -3.508 -2.778 
  [-4.431] [-4.532] [-3.516] [-3.216] [-5.353] [-5.213] [-4.322] [-4.341] 
Economic Freedom  4.303 4.203 3.971 4.922 4.698 5.694 4.406 4.678 
  [2.684] [2.782] [2.529] [2.319] [2.986] [2.246] [2.847] [2.427] 
KKZ_composite  -5.778 -5.521 -5.761 -4.731 -7 -6.567 -7.008 -6.868 
  [-5.572] [-4.207] [-5.657] [-5.247] [-6.210] [-6.341] [-6.240] [-6.143] 
                  
R 2 0.343 0.321 0.345 0.324 0.314 1.321 0.304 0.304 
LogL -1253.8 -1352.8 -1252.8 -1234.8 -1252.8 -1246.8 -1277.8 -1277.8 
LM spatial lag                       1.672 1.682 4.064 4.364 5.303 5.325 6.218 6.218 
LM spatial error                   6.274 7.254 6.638 6.728 7.398 7.374 8.287 8.287 
Robust LM spatial lag           1.071 1.391 0.796 1.496 0.211 0.101 0.03 0.03 
Robust LM spatial error        5.673 5.972 5.369 6.239 4.096 4.186 6.069 6.069 
P-values are in the hook. WS: whole sample, EME: Emerging Market Economics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Estimation  results II:  Bank crisis, regulation, institutions and  liberalization: WT 
Determinants                             1   2   3 
  Spatial and time period effects                                    Spatial and time-period fixed effects   Random spatial effects, fixed 
  WS  EMG   WS  EMG   WS  EMG 
W*Npl 0.245 0.323   -0.008 -0.892   -0.078 -0.922 
  [2.719] [2.834]   [-0.088] [-0.178] [-0.773] [-0.633] 
Activity restrictions                 -0.43 -0.47   -0.775 0.345   -0.774 -0.126 
  [-1.778]                [-1.788]                [-2.744]                 [-2.984]                 [-2.946] [-2.656] 
Required reserves                     0.232 0.212   0.234 0.264   0.234 0.244 
  [4.877] [4.437]   [4.393] [4.393]   [4.720] [4.650] 
Capital regulatory index           -0.31 -0.32   -0.485 -0.415   -0.485 -0.515 
  [-1.082] [-1.082]   [-1.515] [-1.615] [-1.627] [-1.637] 
Financial Liberalisation            -5.296 -4.566   -4.751 -4.551   -4.754 -3.744 
  [-3.081] [-3.341]   [-2.542] [-2.312] [-2.733] [-2.623] 
Banking Freedom -3.221 -2.231   -3.512 -3.312   -3.511 -3.521 
  [-4.332] [-4.452]   [-4.062] [-4.122] [-4.362] [-4.351] 
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Economic Freedom  4.11 4.21   4.459 4.449   4.474 5.774 
  [2.655] [2.455]   [2.700] [2.560]   [2.910] [2.810] 
KKZ_composite  -6.314 -5.544   -7.097 -7.217   -7.101 -6.021 
  [-5.873] [-5.433]   [-5.872] [-5.212] [-6.311] [-6.011] 
W*Activity restrictions 0.906 0.936   -0.401 -0.329   -0.441 0.329 
  [2.176]                [2.346]                [-0.501]                 [-0.611]              [2.176] [2.132] 
W*Required reserves  0.073 0.173   0.071 0.171   0.086 1.216 
  [0.628] [0.738]   [0.332] [0.512]   [0.628] [0.634] 
W*Capital regulatory index  0.186 0.126   0.016 0.017   -0.093 -0.907 
  [0.225] [0.345]   [0.300] [0.321]   [-0.077] [-0.037] 
W*Financial Liberalisation                      -5.668 -5.218   3.566 3.562   3.005 2.005 
  [-1.437] [-1.217]   [0.660] [0.620]   [0.597] [0.584] 
W*Banking Freedom                       2.337 2.327   1.213 1.223   1.947 1.647 
  [1.093] [1.193]   [0.481] [0.451]   [0.403] [0.402] 
W*Economic Freedom                       0.997 1.097   3.634 3.624   4.02 4.02 
  [0.278] [0.378]   [0.622] [0.322]   [0.278] [0.128] 
W*KKZ_composite                        4.01 4.21   -3.95 -3.91   -4.449 -4.449 
  [1.784] [1.684]   [-0.852] [-0.822] [-1.029] [-1.219] 
                  
phi             0.996 0.996 
              [8.421] [8.511] 
Sigma 2 53.082 53.322   58.141 58.211   53.082 54.082 
R 2 0.437 0.447   0.465 0.545   0.309 0.409 
Corrected R2 0.375 0.515   0.308 0.312   0.307 0.127 
LogL -1226 -1243   -1216 -1270   -1216 -1245 
LR_spatial_lag                             23.017 23.237   23.017 24.017   36.852 37.852 
  [0.001] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.001]   [0.004] [0.004] 
LR_spatial_error                 21.891 22.641   21.891 23.491   31.385 32.215 
  [0.002] [0.002]   [0.002] [0.002]   [0.003] [0.023] 
P-values are in the hook. WS: whole sample, EME: Emerging Market Economics.  
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